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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to propose an extension to Lee Smolin’s
hypothesis that our own universe belongs to a population of universes
evolving by natural selection. Smolin’s hypothesis explains why the pa-
rameters of physics possess the values we observe them to possess, but
depends upon the contingent fact that the universe is a quantum rela-
tivistic universe. It is proposed that the prior existence of a quantum
relativistic universe can itself be explained by postulating that a process
of cosmogenic drift evolves universes towards stable (‘rigid’) mathematical
structures.
1 Introduction
According to current mathematical physics, there are many aspects of our phys-
ical universe which are contingent rather than necessary. These include such
things as the values of the numerous free parameters in the standard model
of particle physics, and the parameters which specify the initial conditions in
general relativistic models of the universe. The values of these parameters can-
not be theoretically derived, and need to be determined by experiment and
observation. It transpires that the existence of life is very sensitively dependent
upon the values of these parameters (see Barrow and Tipler 1986, for a com-
pendious survey). If a universe had values for these parameters only slightly
different from the values they possess in our own universe, then that universe
would be incapable of supporting life. Hence, there is a need to explain why a
life-supporting universe exists.
In fact, the problem posed by the contingent values of the free parameters
can be generalised. If our physical universe is conceived to be an instance of a
mathematical structure, (i.e., a structured set), then it is natural to ask why
this mathematical structure physically exists and not some other. The instan-
tiation of one particular mathematical structure is contingent, and requires an
explanation.
One response to this problem of contingency is to postulate the existence of
a collection of universes, which realise numerous different mathematical struc-
tures, and numerous different values for the parameters of physics. It is common
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these days to refer to such a collection as a ‘multiverse’. Multiverses can be dis-
tinguished by whether or not some physical process is suggested to account for
their existence. For example, Linde’s chaotic inflation theory (1983a and 1983b),
and Smolin’s theory of cosmological natural selection (1997), both postulate the
operation of physical processes which yield collections of universes, (or causally
disjoint ‘universe-domains’, in the case of Linde’s theory). Other multiverse
proposals postulate universes which are either not the outcome of a common
process, or not the outcome of any process at all (Tegmark 1998, 2008).
As Tegmark points out, all such proposals which suggest that “some subset
of all mathematical structures. . . is endowed with. . . physical existence,” (1998,
p1), fail to explain why some particular collection of mathematical structures is
endowed with physical existence rather than another. Tegmark’s own response
was to suggest that all mathematical structures have physical existence.1 The
weak anthropic principle similarly postulates the existence of a collection of
universes which is sufficiently large and varied that the conditions which permit
the existence of life will be realised in at least some of the universes. Both
types of proposal accept that a life-permitting universe is a highly untypical
member of the universe collection, and both types of proposal are difficult, if not
impossible, to empirically test. In contrast, Smolin’s proposal of cosmological
natural selection explains the existence of our life-supporting universe, renders
such universes highly typical, and is subject to empirical test. We now proceed
to expound Smolin’s hypothesis.
2 Cosmological natural selection
To understand Smolin’s idea, it is first useful to appreciate that the conditions
for natural selection to occur can be precisely defined formally, in complete
abstraction from any particular physical instance. If a collection of physical
systems satisfies these conditions, then that collection will, with overwhelming
likelihood, evolve by natural selection, irrespective of what those systems are.
The Darwinian evolution of biological systems by natural selection, is just one
particular case of this.
John Barrow asserts that natural selection (or, as he calls it, ‘Darwinian
evolution’), “has just three requirements:
• The existence of variations among the members of a population. These
can be in structure, in function, or in behaviour.
• The likelihood of survival, or of reproduction, depends upon those varia-
tions.
• A means of inheriting characteristics must exist, so that there is some
correlation between the nature of parents and their offspring. Those vari-
1More recently, however, Tegmark (2008) has incorporated the implications of Go¨del in-
completeness and Church-Turing uncomputability, by considering the possibility that only
computable structures, or finite computable structures, physically exist (2008, p22).
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ations that contribute to the likelihood of the parents’ survival will thus
most probably be inherited.
It should be stressed that under these conditions evolution is not an option.
If any population has these properties then it must evolve,” (Barrow 1995, p21).
Smolin hypothesises that there exists a population2 of universes, and that
the values of the free parameters in the standard model of particle physics are
variable characteristics of the universes in the population. For simplicity, let
us accept that the values of the fundamental parameters of physics are fixed in
each universe, but can vary from one universe to another.
Smolin hypothesises that certain types of universe in the population are
reproductively active. He suggests that in those universes where black holes
form, a child universe is created inside the event horizon of the black hole.
Specifically, Smolin’s proposal is that “quantum effects prevent the formation
of singularities, at which time starts or stops. If this is true, then time does not
end in the centers of black holes, but continues into some new region of space-
time. . . Going back towards the alleged first moment of our universe, we find
also that our Big Bang could just be the result of such a bounce in a black hole
that formed in some other region of space and time. Presumably, whether this
postulate corresponds to reality depends on the details of the quantum theory
of gravity. Unfortunately, that theory is not yet complete enough to help us
decide the issue,” (1997, p93).
In the decade since Smolin proposed his idea, loop quantum gravity has
made some significant progress, and its application to cosmology now appears
to support Smolin’s hypothesis. For example, in a recent review, Ashtekar
asserts that “In the distant past, the [quantum] state is peaked on a classical,
contracting pre-big-bang branch which closely follows the evolution dictated by
Friedmann equations. But when the matter density reaches the Planck regime,
quantum geometry effects become significant. Interestingly, they make gravity
repulsive, not only halting the collapse but turning it around; the quantum
state is again peaked on the classical solution now representing the post-big-
bang, expanding universe,” (2006, p12). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the
occurrence of such a bounce inside a black hole remains highly speculative.
Smolin postulates that the reproduction which takes place is reproduction
with inheritance. He assumes that “the basic forms of the laws don’t change
during the bounce, so that the standard model of particle physics describes
the world both before and after the bounce. However, I will assume that the
parameters of the standard model do change during the bounce,” (1997, p94).
Smolin postulates that a child universe inherits almost the same values for the
parameters of physics as those possessed by its parent. He postulates that the
reproduction is not perfect, that small random changes take place in the values
of the parameters. Hence, Smolin postulates reproduction with inheritance and
mutation. As Shimony puts it, “the variable entities are universes, and the
theatre in which the variation occurs is governed by the principles of quantum
2Hereafter, a collection of universes which are related in some way, will be referred to as a
‘population’ of universes.
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gravity (as yet not fully constructed) and the form of the standard model,”
(1999, p217). Smolin’s scenario cannot explain why our universe is relativistic
rather than non-relativistic, and it cannot explain why our universe is a quan-
tum universe rather than a classical universe, because the occurrence of black
holes requires a relativistic universe, and the occurrence of a ‘bounce’ inside the
horizon of a black hole requires a quantum universe.
The number of black holes in a universe is determined by the parameters of
physics, hence the values of the parameters in a universe determine the number
of children born to that universe. If Smolin’s postulate that child universes are
created inside black holes with small random parameter mutations is indeed
correct, then a population that contains some black hole producing universes,
will probably evolve by natural selection. In particular, a population with an
exhaustive, initially uniform distribution of parameter value combinations, will
come to be dominated by universes that maximise the production of black holes.
In addition to the hypothesis that there is a population of universes evolving
by natural selection, Smolin suggests that the parameter values which maximise
black hole production, and therefore child universe birthrate, are also the values
which permit the existence of life. If the universe types with the highest birthrate
are also those universes which permit life, then universes which permit life will
come to dominate the population of universes.
The hypothesis that there is a population of universes evolving by natural
selection is distinct from the hypothesis that the parameter values which max-
imise black hole production are the same parameter values which permit life.
One hypothesis could be true, and the other false. Only if both are true will
life-permitting universes come to dominate the population of universes. If child
universes were created inside black holes with small random parameter varia-
tions, but the parameter values which maximise black hole production were not
the same parameter values which permit life, then there would be a population
of universes which evolves by natural selection, but in which life-permitting
universes do not come to dominate the population.
A weak anthropic principle explanation that imagines a collection of unre-
lated universes, rather than a population of universes evolving by natural selec-
tion, holds that life-permitting universes are special members of the collection.
In contrast, Smolin’s dual proposal that (i) there is a population of universes
evolving by natural selection, and (ii) the parameter values which maximise
black hole production are the same parameter values which permit life, holds
that life-permitting universes are typical members of the collection. In terms of
carbon and organic elements, for example, the theory of cosmological natural
selection “predicts that our universe has these ingredients for life, not because
life is special, but because they are typical of universes found in the collection,”
(Smolin 1997, p204).
Vilenkin (2006) has recently framed an argument which poses a serious chal-
lenge to Smolin’s hypothesis. In summary,3 Vilenkin’s argument is as follows:
In the far future of an eternal de Sitter space-time, black holes will be spon-
3See Smolin (2006) for a full explanation and critique of Vilenkin’s argument.
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taneously created by the fluctuations of quantum fields, at a constant rate. A
universe such as ours appears to be, with a non-zero positive cosmological con-
stant Λ, will evolve towards just such a de Sitter space-time, and the black hole
production from this mechanism will dominate that produced by astrophysical
processes. Moreover, the black hole production rate from this mechanism is
proportional to the value of the cosmological constant Λ, hence in a population
of universes evolving to maximize black hole production, the value of Λ will
be maximized. The small value of Λ in our own universe, argues Vilenkin, is
therefore inconsistent with cosmological natural selection.
The success of Vilenkin’s argument depends largely upon the reality, or oth-
erwise, of the proposed black hole creation mechanism in the far future of a
de Sitter space-time, and its purported dependence upon Λ. Vilenkin’s argu-
ment currently rests upon empirically unverified, and theoretically controversial
physics, but nevertheless constitutes a serious potential problem for cosmologi-
cal natural selection.
For the purpose of this paper, however, the primary problem with Smolin’s
scenario is that it cannot explain why our universe is relativistic rather than
non-relativistic, and it cannot explain why our universe is a quantum universe
rather than a classical universe, because the occurrence of black holes requires
a relativistic universe, and the occurrence of a ‘bounce’ inside the horizon of a
black hole requires a quantum universe.
Thus, Smolin’s hypothesis depends upon the assumption that there is a
quantum relativistic universe at the outset. One can ask for an explanation
of why there should be such a universe, rather than a universe in which, say,
Newtonian gravity governs the large-scale structure of space-time, or in which
classical mechanics and classical field theories govern the behaviour of any par-
ticles and fields which exist. The existence of a quantum relativistic universe
seems to be contingent rather than necessary. There is, therefore, a need to
explain the existence of a quantum relativistic universe.
A proposal for just such an explanation will be made below. The proposal
will be expressed in terms of a variation in the value of the dimensionless grav-
itational parameter ω, and a variation in the value of two of the fundamental
dimensional ‘constants’, the speed of light c and Planck’s constant4 ~. As Kragh
(2006) recounts, there is already a significant history of such proposals in the
physics community, ranging from Dirac’s hypothesis of a time-varying gravita-
tional constant G, to more recent proposals for variable speed of light (VSL)
cosmologies, such as that proposed by Albrecht and Magueijo (1999). Kragh re-
ports out that “hundreds of papers have been written within the class of VSL,”
(p731) and claims that Magueijo’s (2003) invited review article in Reports on
Progress in Physics, indicates that the subject “is considered exciting as well as
belonging to mainstream, if not necessarily orthodox physics,” (p732).
There remains, however, considerable disagreement in the physics commu-
nity over whether a postulated variation in the value of the fundamental di-
mensional constants is well-defined or operationally meaningful, hence the next
4Strictly, this is the ‘reduced’ Planck constant, ~= h/2pi.
5
section will be devoted to a discussion of this issue.
3 Dimensional and dimensionless constants
The fundamental constants of physics, c, ~ and G, are dimensional constants
in the sense that they possess physical dimensions, and their values must be
expressed relative to a choice of physical units. Recall in this context that there
are three fundamental physical dimensions: length [L], time [T], and mass [M].
Each physical quantity is represented to have dimensions given by some combi-
nation of powers of these fundamental dimensions, and each value of a physical
quantity is expressed as a multiple of some chosen unit of those dimensions. The
speed of light has dimensions of [L][T ]−1, and in CGS (Centimetre-Gramme-
Second) units has the value c ≈ 3×1010 cm s−1; Planck’s constant has the value
~ ≈ 10−27g cm2s−1 in CGS units; and Newton’s gravitational constant has the
value G ≈ 6.67× 10−8cm3g−1s−2 in CGS units.
The laws of physics define the necessary relationships between dimensional
quantities. The values of these quantities are variable even within a fixed sys-
tem of units, hence the lawlike equations can be said to define the necessary
relationships between dimensional variables. Nevertheless, the laws of physics
also contain dimensional constants. In particular, the fundamental equations of
relativity and quantum theory, such as the Einstein field equation, the Maxwell
equation, the Schro¨dinger equation, and the Dirac equation, contain the funda-
mental dimensional constants, c, ~, and G.
Ultimately, dimensional constants are necessary in equations which express
the possible relationships between physical variables, because the dimensional
constants change the units on one side of the equation into the units on the
other side. As an example, consider the most famous case in physics, E = mc2.
This equation can be seen as expressing a necessary relationship between the
energy-values and mass-values of a system. In CGS units the energy is in ergs,
where an erg is defined to equal one g cm2s−2, and the mass is in grammes. To
convert the units of the quantity on the right-hand-side of the equation into the
same units as the quantity on the left-hand-side, the mass is multiplied by the
square of the speed of light in vacuum, which has units of cm2s−2. One might
argue that the reason why the (square root of) the conversion factor should
be ≈ 3 × 1010 in CGS units, rather than any other number, follows from the
definition of the cm and the s. Like all dimensional quantities, the value of
fundamental constants such as c changes under a change of physical units.
Intriguingly, the fundamental dimensional constants can also, heuristically at
least, be used to express the limiting relationships between fundamental theories.
Thus, classical physics is often said to be the limit of quantum physics in which
Planck’s constant ~ → 0, and non-relativistic physics is often said to be the
limit of relativistic physics in which the speed of light in vacuum c → ∞. The
flip side of this coin is that ~ is said to set the scale at which quantum effects
become relevant, and c is said to set the speeds at which relativistic effects
become relevant.
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A system with action A is a quantum system if the dimensionless ratio A/~
is small. If this ratio is large, then the system is classical. As ~ → 0, A/~
becomes large even for very small systems, hence classical physics is said to be
the limit of quantum physics in which ~ → 0. Similarly, c sets the speeds at
which relativistic effects become relevant in the sense that a system with speed
ν is relativistic if the dimensionless ratio ν/c is close to 1. If the ratio is a small
fraction, then the system is non-relativistic. As c → ∞, ν/c becomes a small
fraction even for very fast systems, hence non-relativistic physics is said to be
the limit of relativistic physics in which c→∞. In a similar manner, G sets the
scale of gravitational forces, and determines whether a system is gravitational
or not.
Duff, however, argues that no objective meaning can be attached to a varia-
tion in the values of the dimensional constants. According to Duff, “the number
and values of dimensional constants, such as ~, c, G, e, k etc, are quite arbitrary
human conventions. Their job is merely to convert from one system of units
to another. . . the statement that c = 3 × 108 m/s, has no more content than
saying how we convert from one human construct (the meter) to another (the
second),” (2002, p2-3).
To understand Duff’s point, consider ‘geometrized’ units, in which the speed
of light is used to convert units of time into units of length. Thus c · s, for
example, is a unit of length defined to equal the distance light travels in one
second. If time is measured in units of length, then all velocities are converted
from quantities with the dimensions [L][T ]−1 to dimensionless quantities, and
in particular, the speed of light acquires the dimensionless value c = 1. In
geometrized units, anything which has a speed ν less than the speed of light has
a speed in the range 0 ≤ νgeo < 1:
νgeo =
νcgs
ccgs
.
Thus, the speed of light can be used to convert between velocities expressed in
CGS and geometric units as follows:
νcgs = νgeo · ccgs .
Similarly, in geometrized units, the gravitational constant G converts units of
mass to units of length. In fact, in geometrized units all quantities have some
power of length as their dimensions. In general, a quantity with dimensions
LnTmMp in normal units acquires dimensions Ln+m+p in geometrized units,
after conversion via the factor cm(G/c2)p, (Wald 1984, p470).5
Whilst in geometrized units, c = G = 1, if one changes to so-called ‘natural
units’ (such as Planck units), then ~ = c = G = 1, and these constants disap-
5Some interpretations of relativity hold that the unification of space and time into space-
time, entails that length [L] and time [T ] are simply the same dimension, [L] = [T ]. Under
these interpretations, c = 3 × 1010 cm/s is seen as a conversion factor between units of the
same dimension. However, as Flores (2007) points out, “one can consistently use units in
which c = 1 and hold that there is nevertheless a fundamental distinction between space and
time as dimensions.”
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pear from the fundamental equations. Theories expressed in these natural units
provide a non-dimensional formulation of the theory, and the dimensional vari-
ables therein becomes dimensionless. Duff, for example, points out that “any
theory may be cast into a form in which no dimensional quantities ever appear
either in the equations themselves or in their solutions,” (2002, p5). Whilst in
geometrized units, all quantities have dimensions of some power of length [L]n,
in Planck units all quantities are dimensionless, as a result of division by lnP ,
the n-th power of the Planck length lP =
√
G~/c3 ≈ 1.616 × 10−33 cm . In
particular, in natural units all lengths are dimensionless multiples of the Planck
length.
The existence of theoretical formulations in which the dimensional constants
disappear, is duly held to be one of the reasons why a postulated variation in
the values of the dimensional constants cannot be well-defined. However, whilst
different choices of units certainly result in different formulations of a theory,
and whilst the dimensional constants can indeed be eliminated by a judicious
choice of units, it should be noted that the most general formulation of a theory
and its equations is the one which contains the symbols denoting the dimensional
constants as well as the symbols denoting the dimensional variables.
Whilst the arguments recounted above are to the effect that variations in the
fundamental dimensional constants cannot be well-defined, these arguments are
often conflated or conjoined with arguments that such changes are not opera-
tionally meaningful. In the latter case it is argued that a change in a dimensional
constant cannot be unambiguously measured because there is no way of discrim-
inating it from a change in the units of which that constant is a multiple. For
example, if the length of a physical bar, stored at a metrological standards in-
stitute, is used to define the unit of length, one might try to measure a change
in the speed of light from a change in the time taken for light to travel such a
length. In such a scenario, it could be argued that it is the length of the bar
which has changed, not the speed of light.
Whilst it is indeed true that a change in the value of a dimensional variable
could be explained by a change in one’s standard units, this is a truth which
applies to the measurement of dimensional variables, just as much as it applies
to the measurement of dimensional constants. The logical conclusion of this line
of argument is that only dimensionless ratios of dimensional quantities can be
determined by measurement; individual lengths, times and masses would not
be determinable, only ratios of lengths, ratios of times, and ratios of masses.
Duff duly follows this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, asserting that
“experiments measure only dimensionless quantities,” (2002, p5).
However, unless the dimensional quantity being measured is itself used to
define the units in which the quantity is expressed, the question of whether one
can discriminate a change in a dimensional quantity from a change in the units
of which that quantity is a multiple, is an empirical-epistemological question
rather than an ontological question. Whilst the value of a dimensional constant
does indeed change under a change of units, so does the value of a dimensional
variable, and there is no reason to infer from this that a dimensional variable
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is merely a human construct. For example, the rest-mass energy of a system
changes under a change from MeV to keV , but this is no reason to conclude
that rest-mass energy is a human construct. Hence, the question of operational
meaning may be something of a red-herring.
It is, however, certainly true that the units of time and length can them-
selves be defined as functions of the fundamental dimensional constants. Thus,
the standard unit of time is defined in terms of the frequency ν of hyperfine
transitions between ground state energy levels of caesium-133 atoms:
ν =
m2ec
−2e8
h5mN
≡ T−1 ,
where e is the charge of the electron, mN is the mass of the neutron, and me is
the mass of the electron. The period of any cyclic phenomenon is the reciprocal
of the frequency, 1/ν, and in 1967 the second was defined in the International
System (SI) of units to consist of 9,192,631,770 such periods.
From 1960 until 1983, the SI metre was defined to be 1,650,763.73 wave-
lengths (in vacuum) of the orange-red emission line of krypton-86. This is
determined by the Rydberg length R∞:
4piR∞ =
mee
4
ch3
≡ L .
As Barrow and Tipler (1986) comment, “if we adopt L and T as our standards
of length and time then they are defined as constant. We could not measure
any change in fundamental constants which are functions of L and T,” (p242).
Since 1983 the metre has been defined in terms of the unit of time, the second,
so that a metre is defined to be the distance travelled by light, in a vacuum,
during 1/299792458 of a second. Such considerations lead Ellis (2003) to claim
that “it is. . . not possible for the speed of light to vary, because it is the very
basis of measuring distance.”
Magueijo and Moffat (2007) acknowledge that if the unit of length is defined
in such a manner, then the constancy of the speed of light is indeed a tautology.
However, they then provide the following riposte: “An historical analogy may
be of use here. Consider the acceleration of gravity, little g. This was thought
to be a constant in Galileo’s time. One can almost hear the Ellis of the day
stating that g cannot vary, because ‘it has units and can always be defined to
be constant’. The analogy to the present day relativity postulate that c is an
absolute constant is applicable, for the most common method for measuring
time in use in those days did place the constancy of g on the same footing
as c nowadays. If one insists on defining the unit of time from the tick of a
given pendulum clock, then the acceleration of gravity is indeed a constant by
definition. Just like the modern speed of light c. And yet the Newtonian picture
is that the acceleration of gravity varies,” (p1-2).
Whilst there is considerable disagreement that the values of fundamental
dimensional constants have any theoretical significance, there is a consensus
that each different value of a fundamental dimensionless constant, such as the
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fine structure constant α = e2/~c, defines a different theory. The values of the
dimensionless constants are, by definition, invariant under any change of units,
they remain obstinately in the dimensionless formulation of a theory, and their
values have to be set by observation and measurement. Dimensionless constants,
however, are themselves merely functions f(c, ~, G) of dimensional constants, in
which the dimensions of the units cancel. If the variation of dimensionless
constants is meaningful, and if dimensionless constants are functions of the
dimensional constants, then one might ask how variation in the former can be
achieved without variation in the latter. As Magueijo (2003) comments: “If α
is seen to vary one cannot say that all the dimensional parameters that make
it up are constant. Something - e, ~, c, or a combination thereof - has to be
varying. The choice amounts to fixing a system of units, but that choice has
to be made. . . In the context of varying dimensionless constants, that choice
translates into a statement on which dimensional constants are varying.”
Kragh claims that “Magueijo and Albrecht were aware of [objections such as
those which Duff later raised] in their 1999 paper, where they argued that physics
necessarily involves dimensional quantities and that a time variation of these can
be determined on grounds of conventionalism. Moreover, they pointed out that
although it is a matter of convenience to decide which dimensional quantities are
variable and which are constant, the choice has physical implications as it will
typically lead to different predictions,” (2006, p734). (However, if such choices
do indeed lead to different predictions, then such a choice would involve more
than a matter of mere convention).
We will see in the next section how the proposed variation in the dimensional
constant G leads to a generalisation of general relativity containing a dimension-
less parameter ω, whose limit ω → ∞ corresponds to general relativity. There
is, as yet, no comparable generalisation of relativistic quantum theory, hence the
questions of stability under deformation which we consider below, must first be
evaluated for the dimensional constants c and ~. Thus, in the presentation be-
low for extending cosmological natural selection, the proposal will be expounded
in terms of the dimensional constants c and ~, and the dimensionless parameter
ω.
4 Stable mathematical structures
As a first step to explaining the type of universe population postulated by
Smolin, the following conjecture is proposed:
Conjecture 1 At some level, the structure of our physical universe is a stable
mathematical structure.
A stable (‘rigid’) mathematical structure is a structure for which any defor-
mation, in some specified class of deformations, merely leads to an isomorphic
structure (see Mazur 2004). A deformation is a continuous variation of a struc-
ture by means of some parameter(s). Intriguingly, some of the most fundamental
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structures which describe our universe are, indeed, stable structures (Faddeev
1991; Vilela Mendes 1994).
Firstly, whilst the Lie algebra of the inhomogeneous Galilei group, the local
symmetry group of Galilean relativity, is an unstable structure, it deforms into
a family of Lie algebras, parameterised by the speed of light c. All of these
10-dimensional Lie groups are mutually isomorphic to the Poincare group, the
local space-time symmetry group of general relativity. This family of Lie groups
transforms into the Galilei group in the limit c→∞.
Secondly, whilst the Lie algebra defined by the Poisson bracket on the space
of observables in a classical physical theory is an unstable Lie algebra, it deforms
into a family of Lie algebras, parameterised by Planck’s constant ~. All of
these Lie algebras are mutually isomorphic to the Lie algebra defined by the
commutator on the space of observables in the corresponding quantum theory.
If one thinks of each value of ~ as defining a different quantum theory, then
this amounts to the deformation of a classical theory into a family of quantum
theories. The same type of deformation can be performed using C∗-algebras:
“the classical algebra of observables is ‘glued’ to the family of quantum algebras
of observables in such a way that the classical theory literally forms the boundary
of the space containing the pertinent quantum theories (one for each value of ~ >
0),” (Landsman 2005, Section 4.3). The family of quantum theories transforms
into classical theory in the limit ~→ 0.
At least some of the parameters of physics are therefore the deformation
parameters of mathematical structures, and a relativistic quantum universe,
such as our own, corresponds in at least some respects to a stable structure.
There are also some suggestive facts from the standard model of particle
physics, where each gauge force field has an ‘internal’ symmetry group, called
the gauge group. A gauge group must be a compact, connected Lie Group. In
our universe, the gauge group of the electromagnetic force is U(1), the gauge
group of the electroweak force is U(2) ∼= SU(2)×U(1)/Z2, and the gauge group
of the strong force is SU(3). Now, the vanishing of the second cohomology
group of a Lie algebra entails that the Lie algebra is stable (see Vilela Mendes
1994). Semi-simple Lie algebras have a trivial second cohomology group, hence
semi-simple Lie algebras are stable structures. Every simple Lie algebra is semi-
simple, and SU(2) and SU(3) are simple Lie groups, hence the Lie algebras of
SU(2) and SU(3) are stable structures. Moreover, the Lie algebra of U(1) is R,
and, as the only 1-dimensional real Lie algebra, this is also a stable Lie algebra.
There are, however, many simple, compact, connected Lie groups. The list of
the simply connected ones alone, contains the special unitary groups SU(n), n ≥
2; the symplectic groups Sp(n), n ≥ 2; the spin groups Spin(2n + 1), n ≥ 3;
the spin groups Spin(2n), n ≥ 4; and the five exceptional Lie groups E6, E7,
E8, F4, and G2, (Simon 1996, p151). Hence, structural stability alone can only
go so far towards explaining why the gauge fields which exist in our universe
are those which have either U(1), U(2) ∼= SU(2)× U(1)/Z2, or SU(3) as their
gauge groups. The gauge fields which exist in our universe might have to be
explained by a combination of structural stability and additional constraints on
the permissible gauge fields.
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To reiterate, a stable structure is defined to be a structure which remains
isomorphic ‘under a specified class of deformations’. Hence, whether or not a
structure is stable depends upon the class of deformations under consideration,
and the proposal that our physical universe is a stable mathematical structure
is only meaningful with respect to a designated class of deformations. This
requirement is supplied by the next proposal, which postulates that there is a
physical process which randomly changes the parameters of physics:
Conjecture 2 There is a physical process which randomly changes deformation
parameters such as c and ~.
The proposal, then, is that our physical universe is a stable structure with
respect to the class of deformations corresponding to this physical process.
Despite the difficulties of defining or unambiguously ascertaining by obser-
vation and measurement whether the dimensional parameters of physics are ac-
tually subject to variation, the proposal above constitutes a potentially testable
conjecture, and is therefore a scientific conjecture. The existence of such a phys-
ical process will inevitably result in a relativistic quantum universe, even if it
started with a classical universe, or a non-relativistic universe. Moreover, with
the imposition perhaps of further constraints, such a process might produce a
universe with gauge fields like our own, even if it started with quite different
gauge fields. If so, then a quantum relativistic universe with the gauge force
fields we observe, would be a stable region in the mathematical ‘landscape’.
However, such a conjecture only goes so far; the mathematical structures
which describe our universe can only be cast as stable structures at a quite
general level. Whilst a quantum relativistic universe can be said to be a stable
structure, the specific structures of the particles and fields in such a universe
cannot. For example, the coupling constant of a gauge field with gauge group G
corresponds to a choice of metric in the Lie algebra g, (Derdzinksi 1992, p114-
115), and the particular metrics chosen in our own universe are not stable in
any sense; different coupling constants correspond to non-isometric structures
in the gauge group Lie algebras.
Thus, to explain the detailed mathematical structure of our universe, the
notion of evolution towards stable mathematical structures must be combined
with Smolin’s scenario of cosmological evolution by natural selection:
Conjecture 3 Our universe belongs to a population of quantum relativistic uni-
verses, evolving by natural selection.
To reiterate, Smolin’s scenario explains how parameters of the standard
model, such as the coupling constants of the gauge fields, come to possess the
values we observe. It is proposed in this paper that the evolution of universes
which occurs within Smolin’s scenario, takes place within a context established
by the prior evolution of a stable mathematical structure, at a more general
level than the level at which the natural selection process operates. In fact,
the evolution of universes in Smolin’s scenario is dependent upon the prior evo-
lution of a quantum relativistic structure. It is proposed in this paper that
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there are random processes which deformed the structure of the universe, or a
region thereof, into a quantum relativistic universe, and thereon, the processes
postulated in Smolin’s evolution by natural selection produced a multiverse of
quantum relativistic universes.
The other fundamental parameter of physics, along with c and ~, is the
gravitational constant G. To introduce this into the theory of cosmological
evolution, the Brans-Dicke theory of gravitation can be deployed. Brans-Dicke
theory is a generalisation of general relativity, in which the reciprocal of the
gravitational constant 1/G, is replaced by a scalar field φ. The scalar field
φ is an effective (reciprocal of the) gravitational constant, which is capable of
varying from place to place, and from time to time. The Einstein field equations
of general relativity generalise to the Brans-Dicke field equations, in which the
combination of the matter stress-energy tensor T and the scalar field φ generate
the metric tensor. These field equations contain a dimensionless parameter ω
called the Brans-Dicke coupling constant. For each different value of ω, there is
a different Brans-Dicke theory.
The value of ω has to be set by experiment and observation, and current
astronomical observations have established a lower bound such that ω > 40, 000
(Bertotti et al 2003). General relativity is obtained from the family of Brans-
Dicke theories in the limit ω → ∞ (with some exceptions; see Faroni 1999).
This means that general relativity is unstable in the space of mathematical
structures. A deformation of general relativity takes it into the space of Brans-
Dicke theories. Hence, if we postulate that ω is subject to the same random
variation to which c and ~ are subject, then from the theory of cosmogenic drift
we obtain the prediction:
Conjecture 4 The correct theory of classical gravitation in our universe is the
Brans-Dicke theory, for some value of ω.
Whilst a quantum relativistic universe is a stable universe, it seems that a
strictly general relativistic universe is unstable. We are currently unable to place
a finite upper bound on the value of ω in our universe, hence we are currently
unable to observationally distinguish our Brans-Dicke universe from a general
relativistic universe. This, however, may simply be a result of the inadequacy
of current observational technology; after all, the current lower bound on ω is
40, 000, which is still a long way from ∞.
A population of universes in which gravity is governed by Brans-Dicke theory,
is still a population of relativistic universes, and, crucially, black holes exist
within all the Brans-Dicke theories. Exact vacuum solutions of the Einstein
field equations, supplemented by the addition of a scalar field which is such
that φ = 1 everywhere, become exact vacuum solutions of any Brans-Dicke
theory. Hence, a population of Brans-Dicke universes can evolve by natural
selection just as much as a population of general relativistic universes.
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5 Cosmogenic drift
In evolutionary biology it is known that evolution by natural selection is not
the only important evolution process, and that in the absence of selection pres-
sures, the evolution of a population will be dominated by random variations in
the genome, a process called genetic drift. Similarly, the proposal made here
suggests that the values of the parameters of physics cannot be wholly explained
by cosmological evolution by natural selection. However, whilst genetic drift is
a process which applies to a population of biological entities reproducing with
inheritance and random mutation, the cosmological process postulated here is
not restricted to reproducing entities, and in particular is postulated as a neces-
sary prelude to the creation of a population of reproducing universes. Moreover,
genetic drift does not couple the idea of random variation to the notion of sta-
ble structures. Nevertheless, one might wish to refer to the postulated process
which produced a quantum relativistic universe as cosmogenic drift.
To best explain cosmogenic drift, we shall need a concept from evolutionary
biology known as the fitness landscape. Each point on this landscape corre-
sponds to a different combination of genes, and the height of the landscape at
each point represents the average number of progeny produced by an organ-
ism with that combination of genes, which themselves survive to reproduce.
The height of the landscape therefore represents the ‘fitness’ of each possible
genotype. Each progenitor produces offspring with genomes in a small neigh-
bourhood of the position of the progenitor in the landscape. In those parts of
the landscape where selection pressures are weak, none of the progeny will have
a greater fitness. When selection pressures are weak, the fitness landscape is
therefore almost flat. Evolution of a biological population across a flat part of
the fitness landscape will be driven by random diffusion. In contrast, in those
parts of the landscape where selection operates, the landscape will possess gra-
dient. In these parts of the landscape, some of the progeny produced within a
small neighbourhood of one genotype will lie at a slightly greater height because
they yield a greater number of progeny which themselves survive to reproduce.
As a consequence, the population will come to be dominated by this new geno-
type, and will take a step-up to a slightly greater height in the fitness landscape.
This is biological evolution by natural selection.
Smolin (1997) suggested that there is a cosmic fitness landscape analogous
to the biological one, with each point corresponding to a combination of values
for the parameters of physics, and the height at each point representing the
number of progeny produced by a universe with that combination of parameters.
This proposal can be extended by postulating that the cosmic fitness landscape
has a lowest level plateau, corresponding to all the possible types of universe
which do not reproduce. Each point in the lowest level of the cosmic landscape
has zero height because none of these universes yield any progeny, and the
landscape is flat here because natural selection cannot operate in the absence
of reproduction. Evolution does, nevertheless, occur in this part of the cosmic
landscape. Universes, it is proposed, evolve by random diffusion in flat parts of
the cosmic fitness landscape; in particular, universes which cannot reproduce,
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inhabiting the lowest level of the landscape, evolve by such cosmogenic drift.
Eventually, a universe undergoing random cosmogenic drift will evolve into a
quantum relativistic universe, a universe type which is capable of reproduction.
The part of the cosmic fitness landscape which contains universes capable of
reproduction, corresponds to a region of precipitous elevation in the landscape.
This part of the landscape possesses a variety of gradients, and evolution by
natural selection operates, as suggested by Smolin, in the same manner that it
operates in the biological fitness landscape.
There is no necessity for cosmogenic drift to be the type of evolution which
falls under the aegis of the Lagrangian-Hamiltonian dynamics of conventional
physical theory. It is true that some of the modern VSL cosmologies replace the
constant speed of light c with a scalar field ψ = c(x), and propose a modified
Lagrangian incorporating the LagrangianLψ of that scalar field, and the Brans-
Dicke theory is indeed obtained by replacing G with a scalar field which results
in a modified Lagrangian. Nevertheless, it is not proposed that the dimen-
sionless gravitational constant ω evolves according to Lagrangian-Hamiltonian
dynamics. Nor, if there is a generalisation of quantum relativistic theory which
contains comparable dimensionless parameters, is it proposed that these param-
eters would evolve according to Lagrangian-Hamiltonian dynamics. The type of
evolution proposed here is pure random diffusion, and has nothing to do with
the Lagrangian-Hamiltonian dynamics of any quantum relativistic field ψ, for
the evolution of a quantum relativistic universe is itself the proposed outcome
of this process. As Magueijo and Moffat (2007) point out, “it is not true that
a theory has to be defined by a Lagrangian or a Hamiltonian. . . Absence of a
Lagrangian formulation is far from being a general feature of VSL, but we ar-
gue that it may be the point of those that attack the philosophical foundations
of physics at its most fundamental level, introducing the concept of intrinsic
evolution in the laws of physics,” (p4).
Random diffusion is a type of stochastic process, so if the theory of cosmo-
genic drift is to be further developed, and if observable predictions are to be
derived from it, it will be necessary to employ the mathematics of stochastic
processes, a brief explanation of which is duly required.
Mathematicians define a stochastic process to be a time-ordered family of
random variables Xt upon a probability space Ω. Whilst this is not particularly
illuminating in itself, the implicit idea is that Ω is the path-space for the system
under consideration. In other words, each point in this probability space, ω ∈ Ω,
represents a possible history of the system.6
By definition, a random variable X is a function on a probability space
Ω which possesses a probability distribution over its range of possible values,
by virtue of the probability measure on the subsets of the probability space
Ω. In the case of a stochastic process, Xt is a function on the path-space
of the system which represents the position of the system at time t.7 Thus
Xt(ω), the value of the random variable Xt at the point ω ∈ Ω, is the position
6In the case of a stochastic process, these histories will typically be non-differentiable.
7‘Position’ here can be taken to be spatial position, or any sort of state-defining value, such
as the price of a financial stock.
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of the system at time t in history ω. Xt takes different values at different
points because the different points in Ω correspond to different histories of the
system. The probability measure on Ω, the space of histories, determines the
probability distribution over the range of each random variable Xt, and thereby
determines a probability distribution over position at each time t. Different
positions at time t have different probabilities because different histories have
different probabilities.
A stochastic process can also be defined by a function G(x, x′; t) which spec-
ifies the probability of a transition from x to x′ over a time interval t. Given an
initial probability distribution ρ(x, 0), this determines the probability distribu-
tion ρ(x′, t) at a future time t:
ρ(x′, t) =
∫
G(x, x′; t)ρ(x, 0) dx .
In fact, given the transition probabilities G(x, x′; t) and an initial probability
distribution ρ(x, 0), a probability measure on the path-space Ω, and the time
evolution of the probability distribution ρ(x, t), are both determined.
In the special case of a discrete stochastic process, with the transition prob-
ability of going from x to y in one time-step denoted as T (x, y), the probability
p(γ) of a path γ defined by the sequence of positions (x0, . . . , xn) is defined to
be:
p(γ) = T (xn−1, xn) . . . T (x0, x1)ρ(x0, 0) .
As a stochastic process, random diffusion comes in a number of different
varieties, so the first question one might pose to the cosmogenic drift hypothesis,
is to ask which specific type of diffusion is postulated to operate. The simplest
type of diffusion is Brownian motion, (also termed a Wiener process), which is a
simple random walk in which the increments between random variables St have
a normal distribution with a mean value of zero. Geometric Brownian motion,
in contrast, is such that each random variable St has a lognormal distribution.
Moreover, Brownian motion and geometric Brownian motion can each possess
a drift, which ensures that the mean values of the random variables St evolve
as if under the action of an external force. For example, the Black-Scholes
equation, used to calculate the price of financial options, assumes that the value
of underlying stocks will evolve according to geometric Brownian motion with
drift. This stochastic process is typically denoted as
dSt = µStdt+ σStdWt ,
where µ is the percentage drift due to the expected risk-free rate-of-return on
the underlying stock, µSt is the drift-rate, σ is the volatility of the stock, σSt
is the diffusion rate, and dWt is a standard Wiener process.
In terms of the probability distribution ρ on the range of the random vari-
ables St, in the case of simple Brownian motion it evolves according to the
diffusion equation,
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∂ρ/∂t = D∇2ρ ,
whilst in the case of Brownian motion with drift tending towards a terminal
drift-rate ν, it evolves according to the diffusion equation with drift:
∂ρ/∂t = D∇2ρ− ν∇ρ .
D here is the so-called diffusion coefficient, ∇2 is the Laplacian, and ∇ is the
gradient.
To explain the prior evolution of a quantum relativistic universe, diffusion
seems to work equally well as diffusion-with-drift. Simple random diffusion will
eventually evolve a sterile universe into a quantum relativistic universe, at which
point reproduction will be triggered, and evolution by natural selection can kick-
in. Diffusion-with-drift towards the relevant part of the cosmic fitness landscape
will produce a quantum relativistic universe in a shorter time-scale, but given a
presumably eternal length of time, a sense of urgency seems unnecessary. The
form of the stochastic process distribution ρ, whether it is normal, lognormal,
or otherwise, is also largely unimportant to the outcome, (although if negative
values of the parameters are to be excluded, then one might stipulate geometric
Brownian motion). All of which, unfortunately, seems to mitigate against the
possibility of deriving potentially observable predictions from the theory. It
might still be possible to observe the variations in the parameters of physics
within our own universe, and thence to infer the nature of the stochastic process,
but that information would then have to be fed back into the theory, rather than
derived from it.
One can also ask which stochastic differential equation is satisfied by the
random variation of parameters in Smolin’s scenario, and given an answer, one
could ask why cosmological natural selection utilises one particular type of ran-
dom process rather than another. However, because Smolin’s scenario is placed
within the context of a quantum relativistic universe, it could be suggested that
this type of stochastic evolution is determined by the rules of quantum gravity.
In contrast, any type of random cosmogenic drift, from an arbitrary starting
point, would eventually evolve a quantum relativistic universe as a stable struc-
ture, and from that point, a population of reproducing universes would ensue.
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